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Abstract This note demonstrates that when developing countries remove barriers to
migration and integrate their labor markets, children may be driven out of schools
and into informal or paid employment in the comparatively rich countries. In
industrialized countries, the same mechanism might drive families into social
security or government-subsidized jobs.
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Introduction
The issues of child labor, its causes and potential remedies have received
considerable attention in academia and features prominently in the policy papers
of pertinent institutions such as the United Nations and the World Bank.1 This note
looks at how international labor market integration affects child labor. The proposed
framework for the analysis is a two-country version of the basic model proposed in
the seminal paper by Basu and Van (1998) which has been quite influential in the
academic discussion of the economics of child labor and of related policies.
Atl Econ J (2011) 39:165–170
DOI 10.1007/s11293-011-9271-5
1For a general survey covering the wide spectrum of issues related to child labor, see Edmonds (2008). A
narrower account of theoretical and empirical work on the economics of child labor is provided by Basu
(1999).
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The Model and the Closed-Economy Equilibrium
The backbone of the Basu and Van model is provided by two axioms:
The Luxury Axiom A family will send children only to work if the family’s income
would otherwise drop below subsistence levels.
Worker families derive income from work alone. They do not save and, hence, do
not possess any wealth. Returns to capital may be thought to go to a capitalist class
or to foreign nationals who own the entire capital stock.
The Substitution Axiom From the perspective of firms, adult labor and child labor are
substitutes.
There are two countries 1 and 2. Both countries are poor in the sense that the risk
of labor incomes to fall below subsistence levels is a possibility, if not a reality. Each
country comprises Ni families, and each family comprises ni≥2 members, including
one adult and one child who could work. Other family members are either too old or
too young for paid work. Subsistence consumption per capita si may differ between
countries. Adults and children either work or they do not work.
In each country there are mi identical firms, which we aggregate to obtain a
measure of one, producing xi units of a single consumption good. The demand for
labor in each country is derived from the two production functions:
xi ¼ Ti f ðAi þ aiCiÞ ð1Þ
where f(·) is country i’s well-behaved production function, A and C denote the
aggregate number of employed adults and children, respectively, and α≤1 is a
parameter that measures the productivity of children relative to adults. If the number
of firms is sufficiently large to make them wage takers and children’s wages reflect
their productivity relative to adults, firms maximize profits given by:
pi ¼ Ti f ðAi þ aiCiÞ  wiðAi þ aiCiÞ ð2Þ
which yields an adult wage rate of wi=Ti f ′(·). The wage rate for children reflects
their productivity deficit and is: wC;i ¼ aiTi f 0ðÞ ¼ aiwi.
Given the number and composition of families, and since the adult wage rate must
not fall below nisi, which is the subsistence income required by the family, the
supply of effective labor Si is:
SiðwiÞ ¼ Ni if wi  nisið1þ aiÞNi if wi < nisi

ð3Þ
Depending on the position of the demand for labor schedule derived from the
maximization of Equation 2, and given the stepwise labor supply curve described
by Equation 3, each country’s labor market features two stable equilibria: a good
equilibrium in which the adult wage is high enough to support the family without
child labor, a bad equilibrium in which families cannot survive without the added
income derived from child labor, or both.
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The Two-Country Model with an Integrated Labor Market
Suppose workers in country 1 are more productive than in country 2, perhaps
because of a higher capital stock, better production technology, a superior
infrastructure, or a climate that favors agricultural or aquacultural production.
Then w1>w2 when both countries are in the same type of equilibrium, i.e.; with or
without child labor.
Next, assume that countries 1 and 2 open their borders for foreign workers to create
an integrated labor market. The employment decision of workers is described by
The Mobility Axiom Workers prefer to work in their home country where their family
lives. They emigrate to work abroad only if the foreign wage rate exceeds the
domestic wage rate.
Suppose child labor had been eradicated in both countries. Then both countries
start from their good labor market equilibrium, so that country 1 pays a higher wage
rate, as noted above. Then the mobility axiom predicts effective labor in country 1
to be provided in the form of a stepwise, belly-shaped labor supply curve given by:
S1ðw1Þ ¼
N1 þ b2N2 if w1  nis1
N1 þ a1N1 þ b2N2 if w2 < w1 < nis1
N1 þ a1N1 if w1 < w20
8<
: ð4Þ
The consequences for wage rates and employment that result from the removal of
migration barriers and the integration of the two labor markets into one are conveyed
by two propositions:
Proposition 1 When labor is more productive in one of two countries and no bad
equilibrium with child labor exists in either country as long as labor markets remain
isolated, the integration of labor markets may create a bad equilibrium with child
labor in the country with initially higher wage rates.
Proof. See Appendix A
The emergence of child labor is avoidable, though, because a good equilibrium
without child labor may continue to exist, and both equilibriums would be locally stable.
Proposition 2 When labor market integration generates a bad equilibrium with child
labor in the country that featured higher wage rates without migration, this
equilibrium may be unique in the sense that the good equilibrium has disappeared.
Proof. See Appendix A
This proposition strengthens the possibility described by Proposition 1 in the sense that
the equilibriumwith child labormay be unavoidable because it could be universally stable.
Intuition and Graphical Illustration
Figure 1 illustrates the effects suggested by propositions 1 and 2 and may provide some
intuition. Postulated parameter settings that keep the graph less cluttered are s1=0 and
α1=1.
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As long as labor markets are separated, labor market equilibriums are B1 and B2,
respectively, where the solid vertical labor supply curves intersect the country’s labor
demand curve. Only adults work since wage rates exceed subsistence needs in both
countries. There is a step in the labor demand curve at subsistence income nisi, where
families are compelled to send their children to work, though this step has vanished in
the poorer of the two countries because the graph lets subsistence income equal zero.
The graph is drawn to generate a unique equilibrium in each country, though multiple
equilibriums are possible when labor markets are separated, as well.
When borders are opened for migrant or guest workers, adult workers move from
country 2 to country 1 because of the higher wage rate, as postulated by the mobility
axiom. This moves the labor supply curves into their dashed positions. Country 2 moves
to the left, pushing its wage rate up, and country 1 it increases the labor supply by the
same amount, driving its wage rate down. Migration continues until the two countries’
wage rates have converged. By then, some 75 percent of country 2’s adults have migrated
and the wage rate is: bw1þ2. Since this influx of foreign adults alone would have driven
country 1’s labor market into point A1’ and thus the wage rate below subsistence needs,
this new equilibrium features child labor in line with the luxury axiom. The second step
in country 1’s new labor supply curve that occurs at bw2, where foreign workers would
decide to return home, does not come into play in the case depicted here.
Refinements
The above analysis employed several assumptions that served to keep the argument
parsimonious and transparent, but are not strictly needed for the demonstrated result.
One of these assumptions was that worker families do not own any wealth. As
Swinnerton and Rogers (1999) show, policies that redistribute the capital stock
towards workers may indeed eradicate child labor once a sufficient fraction of
workers participate in the returns generated by capital. As long as this fraction
remains below this threshold, however, a bad equilibrium with child labor continues
to loom as a possibility and the results derived above remain valid.
Another assumption is that workers migrate abroad as soon as foreign wage rates
exceed domestic ones. This assumption may certainly be relaxed in favor of assuming
Fig. 1 How labor market integration may generate child labor in a two-country version of the Basu and
Van (1998) model
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some absolute or relative threshold. Qualitative results would not be affected, but the
convergence of wage rates would stop before full equalization is achieved.
It is also assumed that, even after country 2’s workers have migrated, labor supply
decisions are still based on country 2’s subsistence income, despite the fact that one
family member lives abroad and faces higher living costs. This may be relaxed in
favor of letting the family’s subsistence income be a weighted average, i.e.
s1 þ ðn 1Þs2½ =n. This does not differ much from our treatment when the family is
large. If it matters, it is not likely to affect the above propositions.
Finally, the labor supply decisions in the basic Basu and Van (1998) model are
discontinuous. But when individuals may supply any amount of labor, the labor
supply curve may become Z shaped as in Dessing (2002), or if the labor supply
curve switches from a strict stepwise shape to one where the employment of children
kicks in gradually, as in the general model sketched in Basu and Van (1998), there is
again no obvious reason why this would affect the nature of our results.2
Summary and Conclusions
By employing the basic model proposed by Basu and Van (1998) and extending it to a
two-country version, this note looked at how the opening of borders for foreign workers
affects labor markets in developing countries. The two countries are assumed to differ in
labor productivity and to feature closed-economy labor market equilibriums in which
children do not work. The result is that when barriers to migration are removed in favor of
labor market integration, this may generate child labor in the richer of the two countries.
While this has been shown to apply in a formal model with rather strict assumptions, it
should be robust to quite a number of generalizations. Also, child labor may be considered
a stand-in for other expansions of the supply of labor beyond its normal level, such as the
holding of multiple jobs, forcing workers into social security because jobs at their skill
level do not support families any longer, or the emergence of a government-subsidized
new segment of the job market. Thus, the results and risks laid out here should not only be
noted when studying developing countries, but also when looking at the opening and
integration of labor markets between heterogeneous industrial countries.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Good initial equilibria with separated labor markets imply:
bw1 ¼ T1 f 0ðN1Þ > bw2 ¼ T2 f 0ðN2Þ
as well as:
T1 f
0 ð1þ a1ÞN1½  > n1s1 ðA1Þ
2 However, see Gärtner and Gärtner (2011) for a discussion of sufficient conditions for the emergence of
multiple equilibria in the labor market when the labor supply curve is outward-sloping.
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and:
T2 f
0 ð1þ a2ÞN2½  > n2s2: ðA2Þ
The proposition claims that after labor markets became integrated, an equilibrium
is feasible in which:
n1s1 > T1 f
0 ð1þ a1ÞN1 þ b2N2½  ¼ T2 f 0 ð1 b2ÞN2½  > n2s2 ðA3Þ
The inequality given on the right-hand side of Eq. A3 follows from Eq. A2
and f ″(·)<0.
The inequality given on the left-hand side may hold, given that both sides are
determined by independent parameters and f ″(·)<0, which means that f ′(·)
approaches 0 when β2N2 becomes very large.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The post-integration equilibrium with child labor is unique if:
n1s1 > T1 f
0ðN1 þ b2N2Þ
which again is always possible because both sides are determined by independent
parameters and, given f ″(·)<0, it becomes more likely, the larger β2N2.
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